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Honey a f fec ts us i n so many ways, i t i s only n a t u r a l , t h e r e -
f o re , that we should, be concerned w i t h the monetary system of our 
oountry and the way i n which i t ope ra tes . Prom the beginning o f 
tha Uni ted J t a t a s we have t r i a d to so lve the monetary problem and 
U) 
have f a i l e d r epea ted ly . The depress ion o f 1929 brought the faot 
immediately before u s , and the business r e c ess i on o f 1937 emphas-
i z ed our i n a b i l i t y to cope w i t h i t , 
'./ith condi t ions as they a r e , i t is. ev ident that something must 
be done w i t h the system so tha t i n the future the severe bus iness 
oyole may be a l l e v i a t e d . "7 i th t h i s i n mind, l e t us look a t the 
banking i n s t i t u t i o n as i t has luogressed . 
P r i o r to 1913 the exper ience o f the Uni ted J t a t a s w i t h c e n t r a l 
banks was l i m i t e d to the F i r s t and Jecond Banks of the Uhi ted J t a t e s , 
which e x i s t e d between 1791 and 1836, The F i r s t Bank o f the United 
J t a t e s whicl i was organized i n 1791 f a i l e d to be r e cha r t e r ed i n 1811 
not because o f i t s not having been operated e f f i c i e n t l y but f o r p o l i -
t i c a l r easons , Even at t h i s e a r l y da t e , i t beoac« evident that our 
banking system would be hampered and c o n t r o l l e d by p o l i t i c s . 
A f t e r 1811 , the l a c k o f a c e n t r a l bank v/a,3 kaan ly f e l t . The r e -
f o r e , i n 1816, the jecond Nat iona l Bank of the Uni ted J t a t e s was 
char t e red f o r twenty y e a r s . I n 1832 i t beoame the i s sue o f the p r e s i -
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d e n t i a l campaign between Glay ana Jackson , as Jackson who .vas not 
i n favor o f reoharter ing i t won, i t aitomatioal ly went out o f e x i s -
tence in 1836. 
Fo l l ow ing the experience ,v i th the 3ank o f the United j t a t e s 
and the J t a t e banks as oustodiana of r u b l i c funds, the inaep'Ondent 
Treasury uystem, or hard-money p o l i c y , by which the government might 
take charge of i t s om funds, came into ex i s t ence by the Act of J u l y 
4 , 1840. Although the law was repea led i n the f o l l ow ing y e a r , i t 
was re-enacted on August 6 , 1846, T h i s was d isoardea for the n a t i o n a l 
banking system of 1863, whioh e x i s t e d u n t i l 1913, 
The de fec ts o f t h i s system were many. The p r i n o i i - a l one was the 
r i g i d i t y o f i t s note c i r c u l a t i o n . The volume of notes was regu la ted 
not by t h e -vants of t r a d e , but by the p r i c e and the i n t e r e s t y i e l d o f 
the Uni ted J t a t e s bonds. There was no e l a s t i c i t y . Our currency s y s -
tem d i d not a l low fo r seasonal needs or was not able to prevent money 
p a n i c s . 
Too, the pyramiding o f r eserves was another great da feo t . I t r e -
s u l t e d from the a b i l i t y o f a bank to redepoai t i n another a par t of i t s 
l e g a l r e s e r v e . During p e r i o i s o f s t r e s s t h i s proved d e t r i m e n t a l , far 
banks counting the depos i ts which they possessed i n other banks as par t 
o f t h e i r l e g a l r e s e r v e , v/ould o a l l for them. I t was embarrass ing, how-
ever , for these banks to r e c e i v e t h i s o a l l for a epos i t s a t a time when 
they too, were i n need o f a l l t h e i r cash r e s e r v e s . 
'79 were a l s o faoed w i t h tha oltonsy and w a s t e f i a method o f 
c l e a r i n g checks . The only method of c l e a r i n g out-of-town checks 
was through correspondent l3;inks which was very expensive and t i n e 
consuming* 
F i n a l l y , the uncoordinated and e n t i r e l y independent c h a r a c -
t e r of our banking system mad© i t impossible for brinks to he lp one 
another . Even i n s j j i t e o f good Federa l o v e r - s i gh t there was much 
i n e f f i c i e n c y and bad banking , showing t h x t a c e n t r a l oontro i o f 
the business was d e s i r e d . 
I n 1893 th i s d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h the system took the form o f 
a demand for an e l a s t i c note i s s u e * But noth ing was done about i t . 
I t wasn ' t u n t i l 1905 tha t the House Banking and Ciurrenoy Oommittee 
began to work out t e n t a t i v e banking measures based on the idea of 
a c l e a r i n g house a s s o c i a t i o n . 
Then fo l lowaa the r an i o o f 1907 wh ich c l e a r l y showed the e x i s t -
ing d e f e c t s . I t r e s u l t e d i n j B r t i a l reform w i t h the enactment o f 
the A l d r i ch -V r e e l and Law whioh was pure l y an emergency measure. But 
i t d id provide for the o rgan i za t i on of a body known as the Na t i ona l 
Monetary Oommiss i on , J e n a t o r Nelson V/, A l d r i c h , chairman o f this , 
committee, made h i s report in 1912, and recommended a n a t i o n a l r e -
serve a s s o c i a t i o n , o r a c e n t r a l bank w i t h f i f t e e n branches through-
out tha count ry , a t the next e l e c t i o n , the Democrats gained con-
t r o l o f congress, :ind as expeoted, r e j e c t e d the proposal which the 
Republ ican Ooramission had made. They passeu the Federa l Reserve a c t 
Deoembe 23 , 1913, The new a d m i n i s t r a t i o n be l i e ved i n d e c e n t r a l i z a -
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t i o n . I n Qt der t o keep t h e i r ho ld on the people they e s t a b l i s h e d 
a r eg i ona l system. 
The ne-.v law was immediately a t t a c k e d . Bankers i n genera l 
were h o s t i l e to the new form o f a c e n t r d banking system as o u t -
l i n e d in the Federa l Reserve A c t , The Aineiisan Bankers A s s o c i a t i o n 
c a l l e d i t a form of " s o c i a l i s m " , ob jec t ing to the appointments o f 
the pres ident of tlie board which had a dominant p o s i t i o n . The 
g rea tes t ob jec t ions o f bankers were the d i s t r u s t o f the a d m i n i s t r a -
t l o n o f the system w i t h the f ea r of p o l i t i c a l in f luence ana the f ac t 
that no i n t e r e s t -was to ae paid on the r ese rves whioh h a i to be de -
pos i t ed 'Vith ths reserve banks . 
On the other hand, many people lookeu toward t h i s ac t g r a t e -
f u l l y for the b ene f i t s which -were expeotod to be a a r i v e d from i t * 
John dke l ton / i l l i a m s , Oomptroller of the Ju r r e nc y , i n h i s report 
i n 1914 stimmarized the d i r e c t b ene f i t s i n the fo l lowing manner. 
F i r s t , i t would supply an abso lu t e l y sa fe o i r o u l a t i n g medium which 
w i l l conm;ind i t s face va lue i n a l l p a r t s o f the oountry ; second, 
i t provides for m o b i l i z a t i o n o f bank rese rves o f a l l d i s t r i c t s ; 
t h i r d , i t e l im ina t e s the i n d i r e c t t a x o f m i l l i o n s of d o l l a r s a n -
n u a l l y upon the commerce o f the country imposed i n the shape of 
c o l l e c t i o n or exchange charges on checks ; f ou r th , i t fu rn i shes a 
d i scount system by whicSh every well-managed member bank may con-
v e r t commercial paper into money by r ed i s coun t ing ; f i f t h , by making 
, - 5 -i t p o s s i b l e f o r bfinks to convert i t s a s s e t s r e a d i l y into oash t h e n e c e s s i t y f o r l a r g e r r e s e r v e s c e a s e ; s i x t h , i t makes i t p o s s i b l e f o r banks to le nd money to unenoumbered farm p r o p e r t y thereby h e l p i n g the f a r m e r ; s e v e n t h , i t p r o v i d e s for the e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f branohes i n f o r e i g n c o u n t r i e s which should a i d f o r e i g n oomjaerce; e i g h t h , the establ ishment of a system of bicik acceptances md an open market f o r commercial paper w i l l a i d i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r a d e . Opposit ion o r no o p p o s i t i o n , the system was organized and put i nt o p r a c t i c e . The F e d e r a l Reserve A c t , or the Owen-Glass 3 i i l , as i t i s sometimes r e f e r r e d t o , being n/araad a f t e r denator Robert Owen who was chairman of the denate Banking and Finanoe Oommittee, and R e p r e s e n t a t i v e Oarter G l a s s , ohairman o f the House Banking and F i n -ance Oommittee, provided for the d i v i s i o n of the TJhited dtates into twelve r e g i o n a l d i s t r i c t s , making i t a d e c e n t r a l i z e d r e g i o n a l s o t -u p , iiaoh d i s t r i c t c o n t a i n s a r e s e r v e c i t y vvhioh g i v e s the d i s t r i c t i t s name and c o n t a i n s t h e r e s e r v e b c u i k of the d i s t r i c t , jJhese are Boston, Hew Y o r k , Richmond, P h i l a i e l p h i a , A t l a n t a , O l e v e l a n a , Ohioago, M i n n e a p o l i s , d t . L o u i s , Kansas O i t y , D a l l a s , and dan F r a n c i s c o . 
The F e d e r a l Reserve Act recognized t h a t the e s s e n t i a l d i f f i c u l t y i n /American banking l a y in i t s undue d e o e n t r a l i z a t i o n and oonssquent d i s s i p a t i o n of i t s s t r e n g t h , r h n a a m a n t ^ l l y , t h e r e f o r e , it, souf^lit to g ive r e l i e f by p r o v i d i n g for the combination of r e s e r v e s and f o r j o i n t c o n t r o l o f and o v e r s i g h t over b a n k i n g . The r e s e r v e banks were p r o v i _ dad f o r t h i s e n d . 
The c o - o r d i n a t i n g body i s the F.^deral Reserve Bofxrd. I t was composed of e i g h t members, s i x appointed by the p r e s i d e n t v^ith t h e a d v i c e and consent of the denate , and two e x - o f f i o i o members, t h e S e c r e t a r y of the T r e a s u r y and the Comptroller o f the C u r r e n c y , I n 19E3 an act was passed which added the s i x t h a p p o i n t i v e member, a " d i r t f a r m e r " to oare for the a g r i c u l t u r a l i n t e r e s t s . The terms o f o f f i c e were t e n y e a r s and staggard , but t h i s appointment threw the system out o f harmony, do, i n ldoT> the terms were changed to twelve y e a r s . The o f f i c e s of i t a r e i n the Treasury B u i l d i n g i n "Jashington, D,G« The S e c r e t a r y of the Treasury was a l s o chairman of the b o a r d , but one o f the appointed members was designated as governor o£ i t who was t h e c h i e f axeafcive« On August 2 3 , 1935 t h e F e d e r a l Reserve Board became knovm as the Board o f Governors of the F e d e r a l Reserve System and the t i t l e o f governor was changed to ohairman. The removal o f the e x - o f f i c i o mem-
f b e r s was designed to inorease the independent s t a t u s of the new b o a r d . I t c o n s i s t s o f seven members appointed by t h e P r e s i d e n t for a term of f o u r t e e n y e a r s , which a r e s taggard to p r o v i d e f o r r o t a t i o n i n o f f i e e , dome o f the more impcn t a n t d u t i e s of the board a r o ; ( 1 ) to a p -prove o r disapprove changes i n the r e d i s c o u t r a t e s , ( 2 ) to r e v i e w open-market o p e r a t i o n s , ( 3 ) to determine and d e f i n e the char acter of ' the paper which, i s e l i g i b l e f o r r e d i s c o u n t w i t h i n the l i m i t s of the F e d e r a l Reserve A c t , ( 4 ) to p e m i t or r e p u i r e one F e d e r a l Reserve Bank to r e d i s c o u n t t h e paper o f a n o t h e r , ( 5 ) to s u p e r v i s e the i s s u a n c e o f 
Federa l Reserve Ro tes , ( 6 ) to superv i se the Fede ra l Heserve Banks 
and to insure the soundness o f t h i s ope ra t i on . 
Too, p r o v i s i o n s v/ere i »do for a Fede ra l Adv isory Gouiioi l vvhich 
i s composed of twelve members, one member r epresent ing each Fede ra l 
Reserve d i s t r i c t . Tli© members o f the c o u n c i l are s e l e c t ed annua l l y 
by the board o f d i r e c t o r s o f the Fede ra l Reserve Banks, The oounoil 
whioh meets four times a year w i t h the Fede ra l Reserve board has the 
power to ra-alE recormnendations concerning bonking and c r e d i t p o l i c i e s 
and d i s cuss bus iness condi t ions w i t i i the board. I t merely a c t s in 
an adv isory c a p a c i t y , tmd has not been a very important f a c t o r i n 
the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f the system. 
Row as to tha membership i n the F ede ra l Reserve system. F i r s t 
o f a l l , i f a bank i s a n a t i o n a l bank, i t must j o i n the system. I f 
i t i s a s t a t e bank, i t i s a matter o f cho i c e . However, i f it does 
j o i n , i t must l i v e up to the requirements o f the system. The advan-
tages of a s t a t e biink i n j o i n i n g the system are shov/n in the power 
o f red iscount ing , of s e c u r i n g a i d in time o f emergency, i n the p r e s -
t i g e which i s attached to membership, and i n the many s e r v i c e s p e r -
fomed by the system f r ee o f charge f o r them, from the benef i t of the 
c l e a r i n g and c o l l e c t i o n system to t n s assistsnaae of o f f i c e r s of the 
Federa l Reserve Banks at a l l t i r e s on a l l m a t t e r s . However, the F e d -
e r a l Deposit Insurance law r equ i r e s tha t a l l s t a t e banks w i t h depos i ts 
above ^Jl ,000,000 must be raesrnbers of the Fede ra l Reserve system i f they 
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aro to be insured a f t e r J u l y 1 , 1942, Today one out of every two 
and one-ha l f banks i n the tMited j t a t e s belong to the Federa l R e - -
serve system, 
,l3 for the re quireraen ts necessary for membership, i n order to 
become a member, a bank must subscr ibe 6% o f i t s c a p i t a l and s u r -
p lus to the c a p i t a l s tock of the Fede ra l Reserve bank o f i t s d i s t r i c t . 
Too, a member brink must keep rai l o f i t s l e g a l r ese rves on depos i t 
w i t h the Fede ra l Reserve bank. These depos i ts pay no i n t e r e s t , Thh 
la one o f the reasons why s t a t e banks have been r e l u c t a n t to j o i n . 
Bes ides t h i s , the banks are sub jec t to the supeMs ion of tte F ede ra l 
Reserve brank a t a l l t i m e s , 
Now for the reserve requi rements . As one o f the reasons for 
the establ ishraent o f tha system was to get away from the "pyramiding 
o f r e s e r v e s " de f ec t , r eserves which are now deposi ted w i t h the Fede r -
a l Reserve bionk may not be redepos i ted i n anotha: bank, ISie r eserve 
banks are suxjposed to be able to meet emergency dermmds from t h e i r 
member banks, thus a l l e v i a t i n g the de fects o f pyramiding. The p e r -
centage of r eserves fox deraand depos i t s i s 7 , 10 , 13 f o r country 
banks , r ese rve c i t y banks , and c e n t r a l r e s e r v e c i t y banks resp jec t i ve ly 
Against the time depos i ts a 3/ r e se r ve must be kept by the member 
banks i n the form of a deposi t w i t h i c s r eserve bank. 
However, t h i s s e c t i o n o f the law au thor i z e s the Board to change 
reserve requirements for meraber banks " i n order to prevent i n j u r i o u s 
c r e d i t exp^jnsion or c o n t r a c t i o n . ' Thus , t h i s can be done not only 
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to 30untQr-aac expansion out a l s o to an t i o i pa t e and prevent; oon t raa t i on . 
I t d id exac t l y t h i s on January 30, 1937, The Board o f Governors o f 
the Federa l Reserve system increased the p r e v a i l i n g reserve re.puii ements 
f o r member banks by 33-1/3%, as f o l l ows t on demand de i x ta i t s , a t banks 
i n c e n t r a l reserve c i t i e s , from 19-1/2 to 26 pe rcen t ; a t banks i n r ese rve 
c i t i e s , from 15/ to 20/; and a t country banks from 10-1/2/0 to 14%; on 
(4) 
time depos i ts from 4-1/2/ to 6/, 
For the pjurpose o f a f f o rd ing member banks ample time for o rde r l y 
adjustment to t h a changed requirements , one h a l f of tha inc rease b e -
o.-ime e f f e c t i v e l l i r c h 1 , 1937 and the remaining h a l f on May 1 , 1937, By 
that a c t i o n the board e l im ina t ed as a b a s i s o f pjossible c r e d i t expan-
s i on an est imated $1,500,000,000 o f excess r e se r ves which ure s u p e r -
f luous for the present or prospec t i ve needs o f canaerce , i n d u s t r y , md 
a g r i c u l t u r e , which in the judgment o f the board would r e s u l t i n an i n -
j u r i o u s c r e d i t expans ion . 
As a r e s u l t o f t h i s cliange on Maroh 1 , the r equ i r ed reserves o f 
the member banks inc reasea from about ^ , 6 0 0 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 to 4j)5,400,000,000 
and exoess reserves deo l ined from about $2 ,100,000,000 to $1 ,300 ,000 ,000 , 
I n view o f the l a r g e amount o f So-oass r ese rves remain ing a f t e r the 
i n c r ease i n requirements and t h e i r broad d i s t r i b u t i o n , membe. banks 
were able to make the change w i t h very l i t t l e borrowing. The great 
ma j o r i t y of banks had s u f f i c i e n t r ese rves i n excess of requirements to 
, 1 0 -
meet the i n c r e a s e , some drew upon t h e i r ba lances w i t h other banks, 
and although a few found i t necessary to l i q u i d a t e some earning a s -
s e t s , the e f f e c t was not d i s a s t r o u s . 
During the a l i o ted time the member banks so ld government bonds 
bu t , at the same t ime, the Heserve Banks bought these up on the open 
market . Because of t h i s process the reserve of the banks on A p r i l 
30, 193? reached approximate ly $1,600,000,000 but on May 1 , 1937 i t 
Lr) 
was brought back to about $800,000,000.^ 
But we should note that because o f t h i s cushion o f excess r e s e r v e , 
banks had become independent o f the Federa l Heserve system. They had 
no need to borrow as has been shown, ilnd when the squeeze was app l i ed , 
r a the r than go into debt they s o l d s e c u r i t i e s . Moreover, banks which 
had depos i ts i n other banks c a l l e d them hems« The r e s u l t was the e l i m -
(•7i 
i n a t i o n of $1,100,000,000 i n i n t s r - b a n k d-.posits» TTiis aocounts f o r 
the dec l ine o f t o t a l depos i ts o f banks throughout the ocruntry. I n a d -
d i t i o n , i t r e s u l t e d in a d e f i n i t e c on t r a c t i on of bank c r e d i t . The s a l e 
o f s e c u r i t i e s i n t h i s pe r i od and in the pe r i od hmaeaiately f o l l ow ing 
i t outpassed new l o a n s , thereby becoming a r e s t r i c t i n g in f luence on 
bus iness g e n e r a l l y . 
Another purpose of e s t a b l i s h i n g the system was to prov ide for an 
e l a s t i c cu r r ency . There fore , Federa l Heserve Notes wore provided f o r 
i n the a c t . These no t e s , i ssued by tha Federa l Heserve 3-anks are 
backed 100'/, but only 40/ i n go ld , the remaining 60/ i n commercial-paper. 
An e l a s t i c currency was supposed to r e s u l t from the 40-60% r e q u i r e -
ments, as i n time of g rea te r bus iness a o t i v i t y , the banks would have 
more commercial paper, thereby being ab l e to i s s u e more no t e s . I n 
February , 1932, the G l a s s - J t e a g a l l Act a l lowed the banks to use 
Uni ted d ta tes d e c u r i t i e s as px r t o f the 60% reserve requirements be -
h ind Federa l Reserve n o t e s . Federa l Reserve notes are as a r e s u l t 
our most e l a s t i c and most important cu r r ency . 
The Federa l Reserve bank notes have never been very important . 
O r i g i n a l l y , they were to d isp laoe the o ld na. t ional sank no t es , but as 
t h i s was not dona, few were i s s u e d . I n 1918, the p i t tman Act p r o v i -
ded t h a t the Fede ra l Reserve banks i s s u e bank notes secured by P i t t -
nan C e r t i f i c a t e s to take the p lace o f the s i l v e r c e r t i f i c a t e s , which 
would be drawn from c i r c u l a t i o n , './hen the government again purchased 
s i l v e r and r e i s s u e d s i l v e r c e r t i f i c a t e s i n 1921 , the bank notes "were 
c a n c e l l e d . 
Another i s sue o f t ie Fede ra l Reserve bank note was proviaed for 
i n the Finergenoy Banking ac t o f 1933. :;p2,000,000,000 worth of F e d -
e r a l Reserve bank notes were p r i n t e d , but few were i s s u e d , and these 
were r a o a l l e d l a t e r , 
Now to the member banks themselves , 'Then a Federa l Reserve bfmk 
has paid a l l o f i t s necessary expenses, i t s stookholders are e n t i t l e d 
to r ece i ve an annual d i v idend o f 6% on p a i a - i n c a p i t a l s t o ck , the 
d iv idend being cumula t i ve . 
A f t e r these p r i o r c l a ims have been met the banks were r equ i red to 
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pay a l l su rp lus earnings to the government as a f r anoh i sa t a x , 
except they were al lowed to keep one -ha l f of such earn ings and 
b u i l d up a surp lus fund u n t i l i t reached an amount equal to 40% 
o f p a i d - i n Cap i ta lo I n 1919 th© law was amended so as to permit 
banks to r e t a i n a l l surpjlus earn ings a f t e r payment o f p r i o r c l a i r t s 
u n t i l a fund equal to lOO/ of subscr ibed c a p i t a l was accuraulated* 
I n the Banking Act o f 1933, t h i s law was changed so that p r o v i s i on 
was made for a Federa l Deposit Insurance Corporat ion which guaran-
teed a l l depos i ts up to $10,000o 
Each Fede ra l Heserve Risnk tes a board o f d i r e c t o r s composed 
o f n ine men d i v ided i n : G lass A d i r e c t o r s represent ing s t o c k h o l d -
ing member banks. G lass B d i r e c t o r s composed o f bus iness men l o c a -
ted i n the d i s t r i c t , imd G lass G d i r e c t o r s who are appointed by 
the Board o f Governors o f the F ede ra l Reserve system. G lass A and 
B are e l e c t ed by t h a raember banks . The term of each d i r e c t o r i s 
three y e a r s , and a r e so arranged tha t the term o f one d i r e c t o r o f 
each c l a s s e x p i r e s each y e a r . One G lass C a i r e c t o r i s designated 
as ohairman o f tha Board o f d i r e c t o r s , and i s a l s o the Federa l Re-
serve .xgent. The c h i e f execu t i v e o f a r eserve bank i s tha governor 
who i s e l ec t ed by the board of d i r e c t o r s . 
To t i e the whole p lan together i s the Gold J e t t l a n e n t istuid which 
i s a deposi t of gold kept by each Fede ra l Reserve bank a t V/ashington 
for the purpose o f f a c i l i t a t i n g tie c l ea rance o f checks . I n order 
f o r one bank to pay another , the i n d i v i d u a l r ese rve accounts are e i the r 
deb i ted or c r ed i t ed at the c l o s e o f each day ' s b u s i n e s s , and the 
d i f f e r e n c e t r . x i S T c r t e d s a v i n g both time and money. 
T h i s , i n b r i e f , i s the Federa l Reserve dystem. V/e note tha t 
Fede ra l Heserve banks a re p r i m a r i l y banke r s ' banks, which d i f f e r 
g r e a t l y from banking i n s t i t u t i o n s i n other c o u n t r i e s . The reason 
why the system wsia g iven t h i s xmi lue p o s i t i o n , ani why i t s f unc -
t i o n s even i n the ac t were so l i m i t e d i n scope i s t r a ceab l e to 
the f a c t that i t was g ra f t ed on an e x i s t i n g banking stem ins t ead 
('8) 
Of being developed from the root as i n other Huropeioi systems. 
The system was e s t a b l i s h e d . But how d id i t operate? R e d i s -
count ing was to be the p r i n c i p a l means of access vdiioh the member 
banks would have to the Fede ra l xleserve banks . Th i s works so 
tha t i f a manber bank granted a l oan to a oustoraer and took a 
promissory note i n r e t u r n , t h i s promissory note , i f e l i g i b l e , oould 
be passed on by the bank to the Federa l Reserve bank, and r ece i v e 
f o r i t the faoe amount l e s s t h a red iscount r a t e o f the Fede ra l R e -
se rve bank. T h i s was provid-ad f o r i n order to a i d the manber banks 
I n time of s t r e s s . The board oon t r o l l s t h i s operat ion by i t s power 
to change the r ed i s coun t ing r a t e s , and by i t s d e f i n i t i o n o f ooomar-
c l a l and e l i g i b l e paper and no t e s . 
Then, the open market operat ions was to vvork i n the fo l l ow ing 
fashions I f dur ing p r o spe r i t y the Fede ra l Reserve a u t h o r i t i e s f e l t 
t ha t the expiansion o f loans by member bsmks was becoming e x c e s s i v e . 
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they could r a i s e t h a red iscount r a t a to prevent the member banks 
from seour ing too much a i d from the reserve banks . I n a d d i t i o n , 
t h e F e d e r a l Reserve banks would s e l l t h e i r Tki i ted u ta t e s s e c u r i -
t i e s i n tha open-market. On the assumption tha t the purchases 
o f fhs s e c u r i t i e s i s a member bank, the s e o u r i t i e s would be pa i d 
fo r by reducing the deposi t account which t h e member barOcs c a r r y 
w i t h the Federa l Heserve banks . Rinoe t h i s account i s the l e g a l 
r e s e r v e of the member bank, i t would be forced to red iscount a t 
a h igher r a t a i n order to r e p l e n i s h i t s r e s e r v e s ; o therwise the 
amo\mt o f loans and hence depos i ts which i t w i l l be be able to 
make . w i l l be c u r t a i l e d . Even i f an i n d i v i d u a l had purchased the 
s e c u r i t i e s the net r e s u l t v/ouH be the same. 
Beginning March 1 , 1936, complete c o n t r o l overopen-market oper 
a t i ons was c e n t r a l i z e d i n the open-market committee c o n s i s t i n g o f 
the Board of Governors and f i v e r ep r esen ta t i v e o f the Fede ra l R e -
serve banks . T h i s c e n t r a l i z a t i o n m s deemed necessary to end th-e 
p r e v i ous l y e x i s t i n g d i f f u s i o n o f a u t h o r i t y . Open market operat ions 
are to be governed w i th a view of aocoimod.xting commeroe and b u s i -
ness and w i t h regard to t h e i r bear ing upon the genera l c r e d i t s i t -
ua t i on o f the c oun t r y . " 
Thus we sea the system v/as a l l e ged to be able to produce p r i c e 
s t a b i l i t y through i t s oontro i -over the r ed i scount r a t e s on commer-
c i a l paper and through i t s open market operat ions i n the time o f 
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•boom by r a i s i n g red iscount r a t e s and s e l l i n g government s e c u r i - ^ 
t i a s o I n times o f depress ion they would lower rediscount r a t e s 
and buy government s e o u r i t i e s . But t h i s has not worked due to 
the r e l a t i o n o f redisoount r a t e s and market r a t e s i n t h i s count ry . 
I n Great B r i t a i n the red iscount r a t e i s h igher than the market 
r a t e . Th i s means that banks red iscount only i n emergency. Ahere -
a s , here the rediscount r a t e i s g ene ra l l y lower than the market 
r a t e . T h i s makes i t p r o f i t a b l e for the member btuiks to red iscount 
more o r l a s s cont inuous ly w i t h tha Federa l Heserve . There fore , 
i t i s c la imed that the r ed i s count ing f a c i l i t i e s in t h i s country 
l e n d themselves to a permanent i n c r ease i n bimk c r e d i t . 
Too, r ed i scount r a t e s a re not very e f f ec t i ve , i n times of p r o s -
p e r i t y . The o rd ina ry r ese rves o f the banks are such that they can 
c a r r y through a cons ide rab l e expansion o f c r e d i t before they a r e 
foroed to r e s o r t to the Heserve dystem, and by that t iue , the dam-
age could a l ready have been done. Even i f the red isco imt ra t es 
would r a i s e the market r a t e s , i t i s improbable that dera^aid f o r 
c r e d i t would be s lackened , for the inc rease would only be a f r a c t -
i o n a l expense to a bus inoss in^m who needs the c r e d i t . There fore , 
a r i s e i n redisoount r a t e s w i l l have l i t t l e a f f e c t i n checking an 
upward s a v i n g o f p r i c e s . 
However, the advocates of the Heserve dystem repose more 
t r u s t i n the open market operat ions than in the rediscount r a t e s . 
But the open market operat ions a r e l i m i t e d by the a b i l i t y o f the 
Federa l Heserve system to s a i l goverrunent s e c u r i t i e s vvhich i s s t r i c t l y 
l i m i t e d by the anount o f suoh s e c u r i t i e s which they have p r e v i o u s l y 
-as , . . 
acctunulatad. Too, any c o n s t r i c t i v e e f f e c t o f t l ie oi^en market 
po l i oy could be o f f s e t by an inc rease i n the r a t i o o f time d e -
p o s i t s to demand depos i t s , the r e l a t i v e depos i ts o f Reserve and 
o ther c i t i e s as compared w i t h the C e n t r a l Reserve c i t i e s , and 
the v e l o c i t y o f money o r c r e d i t . F i n a l l y , even i f c r e d i t were 
r e s t r i c t e d and t h a i n t e r e s t r a t e s rose , gold and fore ign exchanges 
from abroad might cance l much o f the intended e f f e c t s . 
These operat ions have l i t t l e e f f e c t i n times of boom and even 
l e s s i n stemming a dep ress i on . At such times the volume o f c r e d i t 
s h r i n k s and the banks have i d l e r e s e r v e s , the re f o re , they do not 
have to r e s o r t to rodisoo^jnting i n order to ra.ike l o a n s , and a r e -
duct ion i n the ra t e o f f e r s no b a i t , A S f o r the open market p u r -
chases , i t i s i n e f f e c t i v e for the banks to use t h e i r fund to get 
out o f debt to the Heserve system ra the r than t o make l o a n s . At 
the same t ime , bus iness does not want to borrow wi thout the c o n -
sumer demand which i t has l o s t and banks, too, a re r e l u c t a n t to 
l a n d . 
Now l e t u s look a t how the Fede ra l Reserve system a o t u a l l y has 
worked. 
From 1914-1917 l i t t l e ou ts ide o f r ou t ine mat ters was accom-
p l i s h e d by the F ede ra l Reserve Jys tem. The b anks beo;jme indebted 
to the Heserve banks f o r they found i t hard to pa ,^' the 6% d iv idend 
on t h e i r a tooks . 
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From 1917-1920 the . ' or ld ,/ar g r e a t l y in f luenced i t s a c t i v i t y . 
Our entrance into the c o n f l i c t n e c a s s i x a t a d r a i s i n g huge sums o f 
money to finance the war , which was accomplished by L i b e r t y Loan 
d r i v e s and "Borrow and Buy" p o l i c i e s * The loans of member banks 
inc reased from $9,370,000,000 i n 1917 to $19,852,000,000 i n 1920. 
I n 1918 the hoard was faoed w i t h the problem of e i t h e r p r e -
vent ing Tindue c r e d i t exp;ansion by r a i s i n g tha redte count r a t e s 
h i g h enough so as to discourage manber b-uik r ed i s coun t ing , or to 
keep i n t e r e s t r a t e s down i n oruer to make i t easy for the govern-
ment to r a i s e funds. I t fo l lowed tha l a t t e r p o l i c y . I n r e a l i t y 
they should have r a i s e d the red i scount ing r a t e s . T h i s some m i s -
take i s being made now. The system i s he lp ing the government i n -
s tead o f bus iness . 
I n Hovember 1919 they d id r a i s e the r a t e s u n t i l f i n a l l y i n 
1920 a r a t e of 7% was reached, but by that time expansion had gone 
too f a r . 
Ooraraodity p r i oes f a l l as d id member bank loans and investments . 
Then fo l lowed the dec l ine i n bus iness o f 1920 ana 1921 , But there 
was a tramendous in f low o f gold into t h i s country dur ing the i m -
mediate per iod which f o l l a v e d . Th i s a l lowed the banks to pay o f f 
t h e i r indebtedness to the Heserve Banks, thereby r e s u l t i n g i n a 
cont rao t ion of the Fede ra l Heserve c r e d i t . 
As a r e s u l t , a s l i g h t bus iness r e c e s s i on took place i n 1924. 
The a u t h o r i t i e s of the Fede ra l Heserve banks attempt ed to ease 
t l l « s i t u a t i o n by lower ing redisoount r a t e s and purchas ing govern-
ment s e c u r i t i e s o The problem c l e a r ed up and through 1925 and 1926 
cond i t i ons were f a i r l y s t a b l e . I. ih % 
Gonceming the depress ion , a i r CJharles l:organ47obb i n h i s 
book, "The Money Revo lu t i on " , o f f e r s the fo l l ow ing e xp l ana t i on ; 
I n 1926 the Do l l a r .itab 11 j n a t i o n HO 1 I cy which we corramonly 
c ? . l l a p o l i c y p r i c e s t a b i l i z a t i o n , was i n s t i t u t e d by Governor a t r ong . 
I t 'Was t h i s deqDarturo of the Un i t ed j t a t e s from the gold s tandard 
i n s t e a d o f oausing i n f l a t i o n which kept i n f l a t i o n a t bay from 1922-
1928. By t h i s method tha huge amount o f gold which was f l ow ing i n t o 
the country was exchanged for gold c e r t i f i c a t e s , there fore c r e d i t was 
kept down by the f a c t that i t took 100% gold to buy gold c e r t i f i c a t e s 
i n s t ead o f u s ing i t as tha necessary 40% gold backing for money. How-
eve r , i n 1928 the Federa l Heserve Board turned from the n a t i o n a l p o l -
ioy of s t a b i l i z i n g the d o l l a r to the i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i c y of the t r a d -
i t i o n a l gold s tandard . T h i s move l e t loose the i n f l a t i v e force o f the 
impounded gold o f the d o l l a r s t a b i l i z a t i o n p o l i c y a l l ow ing i n f l a t i o n 
to take p lace up to the l i m i c s of the enormous accumulat ion o f gold 
r e se r ves on hand. At the same t ime, the board adopted a qo l i c y o f d e -
f l a t i o n by r a i s i n g the bank r a t a to 4 , 441/2, or even 5%, Thus i t 
was operat ing both i n f l a t i v e arrd d o f l a t i v e methods. 
The i n f l a t i o n added f u e l t o the specu la t i on then rag ing . The 
* a s - . 
d e f l a t i o n e f f e c t u a l l y k i l l e d the p rosper i t y of the count ry . 
The outburst o f speou la t i on was duo to the opera t ion of the 
gold s tandard a c t i n g on the excess gold r e se r ves when they 
were r e l eased from the s t e r i l i z a t i o n imposea upon them by the 
d o l l a r s t a b i l i z a t i o n p o l i o y . There fo re , i t caused severe i n -
f l a t i o n of currency and c r e d i t , but a t p r i o es too h igh for conioer-
oe and industry to b e n e f i t . Though c r e d i t was over f lowing i n 
the Uni ted j t a t e s , industry had no tee f o r i t a t the h igh r a t e s 
o f 5% whioh i t cou ld be ob ta inea . I t WaS usea to a 3- l/2% bank 
r a t e * At such a r a t a i t was i t e l e s s as f a r as commerce ;aid i n -
dus t r y was conoerr ie i . There fore , commerce and indust ry dec l ined 
but specu la t i on f l o u r i s h a u . Banks welcomed these amateur s p e c -
u l a t o r s as a p r o f i t a b l e ou t l e t for t h e i r su rp lus money then not 
be ing used by b u s i n e s s . At f i r s t the h i g h rates h;juL no e f f e c t 
on spe cu l a t i on * 
The e f f e c t o f t h a Fede ra l Reserve 3o;ard to r a i s e r a t e s t h e r e -
by to stop specu l a t i on merely increased i t , when brokers found 
they cou ldn ' t get the monqy they needed from banks, they o f f e red 
extravagant r a t e s o f i n t e r e s t to i n d i v i d u a l s * The end came when 
the bank r a t e was r a i s e d i n xiugust, 1929 to 6%, 
At t h i s point he a s s e r t s that con t ra ry to the popular no t i on , 
the dec l i n e i n p r o spe r i t y preceded the c o l l apse i n speou la t i on , and 
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was not caused by that c o l l aps e * I t was ra ther the former tha t 
caused the l a t t e r . And i t was the d e f l a t i v e e f f e c t of the r i s e 
o f the bank r a t e from 3-1/2 to 5% and f i n a l l y to 6% tha t caused 
the dec l ine i n p r o s p e r i t y . The r a t e s ware too h igh for commeroe 
and i n d u s t r y * 
T h i s i s the in terpro tv t t i on advanced by d i r Ghar les ijlorgan-
V/ebb who i s a meaaber of the managed currency f i e l d . Eawevar, he 
i s suggest ing that the r a t e s were too h i g h . Chat the;/ should have 
been kep low, and that expansion of c r e d i t continued not only to 
specu la to rs but to bus iness and commeroe as w e l l . He f a i l e d to 
r e a l i z e t ha t in the per iod of 1928 and 1929 banks vvere loaded w i t h 
loans whioh h;3d beennade and cont inued i n d e f i n i t e l y * They had no 
e x t r a money to ca r ry on expans ion , Th© peak had been reaohed, a 
d e c l i n e was sure to fo l low* I t was too l a t e to t u r n the tab les at 
that t ime , 
E v i d e n t l y ha a l so f a i l e d to r e a l i z e that i f bus iness sees a 
chance to make p r o f i t s , a lower or a h igher r a t e o f i n t e r e s t has 
l i t t l e e f f e c t on the ajnount o f money borrowed* Bus iness was at 
i t s peak* F a r - s i g h t e d men saw the i n e v i t a b l e d e c l i n e , ana no p r o -
f i t s were a n t i c i p a t e d . 
I t seems to me tha t the mis take l i e s i n the faot tha t when the 
accumulat ion of gold of the s t a b i l i z a t i o n p o l i c y was se t loose , 
too much expansion was a l lowed to take p l ace * ?hat shoula have been 
done was the reserve re juirements ;ana redisoount r a t e s should i E v e 
been r a i s e d iimiiediately wlien the money WaS p lacea i n c i r c u l a -
t i o n , 'Therefore, expansion woulu. have 'oeen gradual* 'The r a i s -
ing o f the rates '.vould h-r/e been a deflati-ve movement and one 
to oounter-act the i n f l a t i v e gold put on tli-e marte t , 
I t n i n k that c a i d i t i o n s -di ich fo l lowed the i s s u i n g o f that 
acouHtulated gold i s coriiparable to the p e i i o d today which s h a l l 
be d i scussed l a t e r , S-
Almost immediately a f t e r the bra^jJc i n the s e c u r i t y marke ts , 
the Federa l desurvc dystom began i t s eas ing measures. I n 19aO, 
the radisoo'ont r a t e was lewored to d/a and f u r t h e r rt-Iuced to an 
a l l - t i m e low of 1-1/2%, i n L a y , 1 9 3 1 , However, bus iness o o n t i n -
ued to dec l inee The Fede ra l Ifcserve i3oard engaged e x t e n s i v e l y 
i n the op*jn-market operaitiOiiS w i t l i a view to easing the marte t 
s i t u a t i o n g e n e r a l l y . I n the t-wo y e a r s , 19a0-1931, they purchased 
about $300,000,000 o f government aec-or i t i es -ind i n 19a2 over 
$1,000,OoO,OOU« I t was expected that the r e s u l t i n g i n c r ea s e i n 
loanable funds i n the hiinds o f p r i v a t e i n s t i t u t i o n s would, Chrough 
the reduct ion o f r a t e s , s t imu la t e rcoovery . 
I n s p i t e o f these purch^ases, maaber bank loans continued t® 
con t rac t s T h i s cont inued c o n t r a c t i o n i n conaiieraial bank c r e d i t 
has been one o f the most d i s t u r b i n g in f luences i n the recovery 
program. Bank expansion m s t take p lace befor e recovery Oun laro-
caed . In 1933, tha deprec i a t i on of the d o l l a r and the HsH,xi« p r o -
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gr««i whic l i r a i s e d cos t s and p r i c e s threatened the l i t t l e r e -
covery which had taken p l a c e . I n 1933 and 1934, tha govern-
ment stepped i n and passed laws to s t i m l a t e loans by s e t t i n g up . 
and extending the powers o f t h a aecons t ruc t i on Finance Oorpora-
t i o n . Home Owner's Loan Oorporat ion, The I n d u s t r i a l Loans A c t , 
e t c * V/ith the c r e a t i o n of these f a c i l i t i e s , bajlk loans expanded, 
but the inc r ease was s h o r t - l i v e d . 
The aecons t ruc t i on Finance Oorporation was one faotox 
tha t a c c e l e r a t ed the run on the banks i n the l a t t e r par t o f 1932 
and e a r l y 1933* I t had been au thor i z ed to fin?iuoe banks i f neces-
s a r y , but p fubl icat ion o f these loans was not made p u b l i c . I n 19v^ 
Congress enacted a b i l l c a l l i n g for p u b l i c a t i o n o f these l o a n s , 
IThen these f a c t s were made p u b l i c , people beoame uneasy about t h e i r 
money r e s t i n g i n the banks who vtere r e c i p i e n t s o f the l o a n s . Fear 
s e t i n , and a genera l run on banks began, whidiwas h a l t e d only by 
tha Bank Hol iday dec lared by P res ident BDOsevelt on K a r c h 5, 1933. 
But the purchase o f bonds i n t h e open market by the F e d -
e r a l Heserve Board from 1929-1933 m a t e r i a l l y increased the supply 
o f bank r e s e r v e s . These r ese rves were c r ea t ed through purohasea 
o f Un i ted S t a t e s Government S e c u r i t i e s by the Federa l Heserve Banks 
as a pa r t o f the sys tem 's p o l i c y to ease money condi t ions w i t h a 
view to counterac t ion de f l a t i ona ry foroes and encouraging r ecovery . 
I n the autumn o f 1933, when exoess r ese rves had increased to $800,000,000, 
tho system, d i s con t inued i t s open market purchases . S ince tha t 
t ime reserves have been increased by iraportat ion o f gold from 
abroad, and by the issuance of $700,000,000 o f s i l v e r co in and 
currency by the T r e a s u r y . These r ese rves accumulated and be -
came 30 excess i ve that i n 1936 i t r a i s e d the r ese r ve r e q u i r e -
ments as a means o f r e s t r a i n i n g the pes s i b i l i t i e s o f commercial 
c r e d i t i n f l a t i o n . However, even a f t e r t h i s a c t i o n , the excess 
r ese rves remained f a r l a r g e r than they were p r i o r to 1934. 
' . At tha t saraa time a new dilemma appeared. The appear -
ance o f strong s p e c u l a t i v e tendencies i n t h a f i n a n c i a l and comm-
e r c i a l markets seemed to deraand not only a t i g l i t en ing of margin 
ra ]u i r oments , but a l s o of i n t e r e s t r a t e s ; but , on the other hand, 
an i n c r ea s e i n the i n t e r e s t r a t e s would s e r i o u s l y a f f e c t the gov-
ernment 's f i s c a l problem. The system again chose to a i d the gov-
ernment, 
Mar r ine r E o c l e s , ohairman o f t h a Federa l Heserve Hoard, 
i n March 1937 advocated the continuance o f the easy money p o l i c y 
under present c o n d i t i o n s . He s a i d tha t to r e s t r i c t the a v a i l a b l e 
supply o f c a p i t a l and t h u s . t o make i t d i f f i c u l t to employ people 
out o f work would be both an t i - soa i « l and uneconomic. But he d i d 
say tha t to be s u c c e s s f u l i t hod to be accompanied by a prompt 
ba l anc ing of tha Fede ra l budget and the subsa.quent re t i rement o f 
p u b l i c debts by the government i n r e l a t i o n s h i p to the expansion o f 
p r i v a t e c r e d i t , i^'^^ 
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I n March 1937 when the Board r a i s e d the r eservo 
raquiraments to the l i m i t , many people aeo lared the ac t v/ould 
causa a d a c l i n a i n b u s i n e s s . I n togust, 1937, a b i is inoss r e -
cess i on se t i n , "Pheir p r e d i c t i o n had oome t r u e . 
But I do not th ink t h a r e cess i on was due wholly to 
tha a c t i ons o f the Board , At tha t t ime ooiidit ions were such 
tha t a d e c l i n e was c e r t a i n to f o l l ow . 
Temporary i n f l a t i o n had been caused by the bonus pen-
s ions being p a i d , and p r i c e s were exceedingly h igh caused by 
an t i o ips i t i on of v/ar, Product ion had baen unusua l l y a,otive i n 
t h i s por iod , but the increase i n the output was not as great as 
that i n buy ing , and i n v e n t o r i e s were enormous having been pour-
chased i n the w i n t e r o f 1936 and the sp r ing of 1937. 
The r a i s i n g of the r ese rve requirements j u s t made the 
aware of the p r e v a i l i n g c o n d i t i o n s , ij'ear set i n . Thus, 
the reserve system helped on a c r i s i s tha t v/as bound to a r r i v e . 
Too, people were a l l a n t i c i p a t i n g i n f l a t i o n and began to buy 
s tocks and oorcmodities. Huge government expienaitures and i t s 
monitary p o l i c i e s seemed to p r ed i c t i t . But in 1937, the govern-
ment began to u t i l i z e and borrow t h a money from the s o c i a l s e c u r -
i t y fund. T h i s , i n i t s e l f , was a d e f l a t i ona ry measure, f o r i n -
s t ead o f borrowing thenoney on the market which would extend c r ed i t 
they used the money c o l l e c t e d as t a x e s . Along w i t h t h i s , the govern 
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ment in t im ida t ed that they intended to halanco t h e i r budget. 
At the same t i i a s , r ese rve requirements h;ai been r a i s e d . V/ith 
t h i s r e v e r s a l of p o l i c y , i n f l a t i o n looked improbable. People 
began to unload t h e i r s tocks ;ind coiffloodities. 
On August 20 , 1937, d iscount r a t e s were reduced from 
2 to 1-1/2/0O By thus c u t t i n g the r a t e s , the Heservey systam 
assured the bus iness tha t ©he banks would be i n a p o s i t i o n to 
l « d cheap ly , F n i s was a t ime ly g a s t u r a . I t a s s i s t e d i n c a r r y -
ing out the sys tem's po l i c y of monetary ease and make Federa l 
Heserve bank c r e d i t a v a i l a b l e to commeroe, a g r i c u l t u r e , and b u s i -
n e s s . These were the f i r s t changes i n busio d iscount r a t e s s ince 
May, 1933, But before use oould be made of t i * se lov/ered r a t e s , 
bus iness had dao l i r ed to such an extant aria feur had se t i n that 
they were not o f much v a l u e . Bus iness continued to a e o i i n e . In 
December, 1937, i n d u s t r i a l a o t i v i t y daol i r ied fu r the r to a l e v e l •  
o f about 25% below the f i r s t e ight months o f 1937, 
Now i n 1938 tha doard i s t r y i n g to slow up c r e d i t expan-
sion which i s r e s u l t i n g from Pres ident Rooseve l t ' s gold d e s t e r i l i z a -
t i o n program. Dur ing A p r i l , 1938, the F ede ra l Reserve open market 
ooramittee has s o l d $108,000,000 of .government bonds and bought 
$89,000,000 of Treasury b i l l s and $19,000,000 of Treasury notes i n 
an attempt to check the r i s e i n government bond p r i c e a i T h i s w i l l 
tend to ho ld up i n t e r e s t r a t e s and oounter-act to some extent the 
bene f i t s of the recovery measures. Th is i s to prevent a harmful r e -
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ao t i on which w i l l r e s u l t l a t e r i f bonds advanoe too r a p i d l y u n -
der present easy money oond i t i ons . 
I t i s t h i s cond i t i on which I b e l i e v e comparable to the 
per iod which fo l lowed the r e l easement of the accTmaulated gold r e -
serve from the d o l l a r s t a b i l i z a t i o n p o l i c y i n 1928. 
P :JU1 Douglass, Pro fessor o f Economics a t the I f t i i ve rs i t y 
o f Chicago, c lahns tha t our system o f banking helps to laake b u s i -
ness uns tab l e i n a t l e a s t three ways : 
( 1 ) I t c rea tes a cumulat ive m u l t i p l i c a t i o n o f c r e d i t a t t imes 
when i t i s not needed, and a cumulat ive c on t rac t i on o f 
c r e d i t when c r e d i t i s most needed, 
( 2 ) I n p r a c t i c e i t he lps to f inance investment through th e 
c r e a t i o n of b;jnk c r e d i t , and the sharp f l u c t u a t i o n s i n 
the demand for c a p i t a l goods which t h i s causes accentuates 
both t h a upswing and the do'wnward c o l l a p s e o f b u s i n e s s , 
( 3 ) I t i s always menaced by the fact tha t the bank c r e d i t which 
i t c r ea t es i s many times the amount o f cash into whid-i i t 
i s suprpossdly c o n v e r t i b l e , so tha t the hixnking system c a n -
not redeem the c la ims aga ins t i t i f any cons iderable p e r c e n t -
(/// 
age of i t s depos i tors ask f o r cash a t the same t ime . 
These c r i t i c i s m s seem to rne to be w e l l d i r e c t e d . To correot 
these e v i l s , va r i ous p lans have been dev ised. Dr , John Bauer and K a t h -
a n i e l Gold proposed than an I f i i i ted o ta tes bank be se t up whioh 
w i l l e s t a b l i s h branches throughout the country which may take 
over those p r i v a t e b,anks which c rea te demand a e p o s i t s . Th is bank, 
opera t ing i n cooperat ion w i t h a Bureau o f F i s c a l Oontroi and a 
P u b l i c Improvements Oorporation v/ould alone iiava the power to 
c r ea t e c r e d i t . I t would make loans to p r i v a t e business and a d -
vance c r e d i t to the P. I .Oe for a program of pub l i c works to put 
a l l the unemployed to work. The primary purpose i s to make a v a i l -
ab le the necessary monetary purohaaing po i ioy for the unemployad. 
I n a d d i t i o n , the bank would seek to s t a b i l i z e the genera l p r i c e 
I f y e l c I f p r i o es f e l l below a normal l e v e l , the proport ion o f new 
currency i s s u e a for improvements would be inorecisea, thus sending 
p r i c e s up a ga in . I f p r i oes rose above normal , the. i ssuance o f new 
Qi) 
money would be reduced thus lower ing p r i o e s . 
But Douglass d isagrees v i t h t r i i s in t ha t he be l i eves danger 
l i e s i n making a governmental agency the s o l a body to make oom-xrc ia l 
loans to p r i v a t e i ndus t r y , f e a r ing that p o l i t i c a l in f luence would 
enter i n * 
In p lace of t h i s h« proposes the p lan set f o r t h by F . 0, 
Jimmons, He vvculd take the c r e a t i o n o f purchas ing power away from 
tha p r i v a t e banks and vvaild lodge i t i n the hands o f the governmant* 
Thus, the ownership o f thB Federa l Reserve banks, which now l i e u i n 
the hands of the p r i v a t e menber banks, would be t -kan over by the 
n a t i o n a l governmont througli the irarohase a t par of t h e i r s t o ck . The 
Fede ra l Reserve bank would then begin to buy up govsrnment bonds 
e i t h e r from the bunks or i n the open market and would i s sue i n r e -
t u r n Federa l Reserve notes equal to tha par v a l u e o f the bonds, |' 
!I5xe govarnrnant, t h e r e f o r e , would reoe ive the i n t e r e s t upon those 
government bonds. The government would then save the present i n -
t e r e s t o f approx imats ly $1,000,000,000 a y e a r , p lus a p r o f i t on 
a l l new money i s s u e d . Monetary f/uroliasing power 'would be created 
by the government i n s t e a d o f by p r i v a t e agenc i es , Dexjoslt banks 
would have to keep 100% rese rve i n c a s h , the re fo re deposi t banking 
would be abso lu t e l y sa fe and the defeot o f a f r a c t i o n a l r ese rve would 
be removed. 
As f o r long term l o a n s , these would be maua through th e 
d i r e c t purchase of bonds or s e o u r i t i e s by i n a i v i d u a l customers or 
through investment t r u s t s . These investment t r u s t s oould obta in 
money from the genera l pub l i o by s e l l i n g t h e i r ovn shares and i n v e s t i n g Che 
cash r e ce i v ed into i n d u s t r y , but not i n v e s t i n g more than the amounts 
pa i d in to them, dhc t t - t ime loans oould be handled i n t h e same way. 
A l s o , t h i s p l an by a b o l i s h i n g t h a d i f f e r ence between c r e d i t 
and money would enable soc i e t y to oontro i the e n t i r e amount o f the 
o i r o u l a t i n g meditim ins t ead o f v a i n l y t r y i n g to c on t r o l the p r i v a t e 
medi-um of money^ and through i n e f f e c t i v e redisoormt and open market 
p o l i c i e s * secondly, i t would prevent the c r e a t i o n o f commercial c r e -
d i t to f inance investment , s i nce investments would have to oorae from 
s a v i n g s , -
auiiiiik-i izsd, the p l an would i n su r e the sa fe ty o f d epos i t s , 
g ive l a r g e revenues to the government, prov ide oomplete s o c i a l c o n -
t r o l over monetary mat ters and present abnormal f l u c t u a t i o n s i n the 
c a p i t a l market . At the same time i t vvould permi t the a l l o c a t i o n o f 
produot iva resources as between i n d i v i d u a l concerns to remain p r i m a r -
i l y i n p r i v a t e hands. 
Thus we sea tha qjlan sot f o r t h by P ro f e sso r Douglass, i , 
too , agree tha t a change i s necessary , and althougl i approving o f h i a 
p l a n , propose other measures. 
To me the w i ses t measures would be the divorcement o f the 
banking systam e n t i r e l y from the hands o f the government and i t s p o l i -
c i e s . I f the banking system were func t i on ing to a i d business and i n -
dust ry to i t s utmost, the government would be b e n e f i t i n g , too. I n the 
past i t has been tha s h i f t i n g from one to the o ther that has ru ined the 
attempt to curb the severe bus iness c y c l e s . But a t j r esent , w i t h gov-
ernnant r e gu l a t i on being maae more s t r i n g en t i n a l l f i e l d s , t h i s p lan 
does not seam a t a l l pirobable, -
There fo re , other measures whioh are more l i k e l y to be p o s s i -
b l e should ba suggested. There s t i l l i s a s e r i o u s c o n f l i c t of j u r i s -
d i c t i o n between s t a t e and n a t i o n a l banking laivs which po in t s to the 
n e c e s s i t y o f s t reng then ing , i n t e g r a t i o n and be t t e r ooordinat ion o f b a r k -
ing p o l i o y , Nov? laws such as i ' edera l Deposit Insurance a r e aimed at 
t h i s . Others i n t h i s d i r e c i i u n should f o l l ow , u n t i l tlie bariking system 
would be on© u n i t . 
Profoasor IXauglass c la imed tha t bank c r e d i t which i t 
c r ea t e s i s many t imes the amount o f cash into whioh i t i s s u p -
posedly c o n v e r t i b l e and the re f o r e harmfu l , I agree i n t h i s , but 
propose a change i n the rediscount ra tes to c o r r e c t the d e f i c i t , 
':7ith re fe rence to page 1 5 , the present p l an o f r ed i s count ing 
lends i t s e l f to a permanent inc rease i n bank c r e d i t . I f r e d i s -
counting r a t e s ware h igher than the i n t e r e s t r a t e s as i s the case 
i n Great B r i t a i n , ba rks would red iscount only i n times of emer-
gency; there fore tha Federa l Reserve system wo'iLd have more oon-
t r o i over them. 
T h i s wodLd bo an extreme d e f l a t i ona r y measure, i f put 
in to p r a c t i c e . However, a t a time such as i s p r e v a i l i n g when the 
gold d e s t a r i l i z a t i o n ac t i s being i n s t i t u t e d and a d e f l a t i o n a r y 
measure i s necessa ry , i t seems a w ise t ime to s t a r t suoh r a t e s , 
i ixcess r e s e r v es a r e h igh enough so as to make t h i s p o s s i b l e w i t l i -
out causing banks to borrow to a great e x t e n t . I t i s the pyscho log -
i c a l e f f e c t on tha people w h i d i would need to be coiuateracted. But 
t h i s , too , cou ld be met i f t ha government i n s t i t u t e d measures whioh 
would encourage indus t ry and give i t a f a vo i ab l e out look , . 
T h i s , in b r i e f , i s our monetary sys tem. Included here a re 
the changes proposed by eminent a u t h o r i t i e s to co r r ec t the de fects i n 
i t , 'Ye know tha t the system has f a i l e d i n curbing thece press ion and 
and i n speeding up reoovery. However, we must take into cons ide ra t i on 
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that the Federa l Reserve Jystem oamot ac t as i t deems n e c e s -
aary for the good o f bus iness a lone* Ma y other th ings enter 
i n * The V/orld ',/ar broke out soon a f t e r i t s formation and r e -
qu i red i n d i v i d u a l t a o t i o s to handle the s i t u a t i o n . During the 
" t w e n t i e s " the Board was faoed w i t h tha dilemma of e i t h e r a i d -
ing the Uni ted J t a t e s o r the European 3ountd.es w i t h the idea that 
t h e i r p r o spe r i t y meant p r o s p e r i t y for u s , too. Even had other 
steps been taken , the outoomo co-old not have been xi^redicted, 
Now, they are faoed w i t h the problem of making money 
a v a i l a b l e f o r the government and oontraot ing the c r e d i t to avo id 
i n f l a t i o n o 
Thus we sea tha t i t i s a oomplioated mat t e r , '7© have 
developed and gone a long way down the road to good banking from 
the f i r s t monetary system of the Uni ted d t a t e s , but the road i s 
s t i l l open to a b e t t e r system for which v-ie are s t r i v i n g . 
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